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This essay applies theory and method developed over the past two decades
by a number of cognitively- and psychologically-oriented social scientists
to explore antipathy between Czechs and Roma in the present-day Czech
Republic. It investigates how Czech understandings of personhood and
otherness are variously organized, acquired, and practiced. Although
ethnic hatred continues to be a problem in the Czech Republic, recent
findings in psychological anthropology advise against assuming that it is
reproduced wholesale from one generation to the next—nor even one
instant to the next. The main source of data is the narratives of twentyfive young Czechs, who recall their earliest childhood encounters with
Roma. I use their stories to explore the early learning of ethnic categories
and formation of affects and motives, based on both the regularities they
experience as members of Czech society and the unique circumstances of
their individual lives.

Prologue
The following synopsis of Czech-Roma interrelations was
broadcast on Radio Prague on March 16, 2010:
The conditions in which the Czech Republic’s Roma minority lives
have not improved in the last decade. In fact, many of the groups
working with Roma say their situation in society and their
relationship with Czechs are in a downward spiral.
Unemployment is higher than 80%. High debt is rampant. This
1

The term “Rom” (plural, Roma) means “man” in Romany and was adopted by the
Roma Union in 1971 as a substitute for the pejorative “gypsy.” There are an estimated
300,000 Roma in the Czech Republic—roughly ten percent of the population—and
tensions between Roma and Czechs have existed since the sixteenth century.
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combination has fostered social exclusion and a breeding ground
for crime and drug use. In turn, violent crime against Roma
communities has become more extreme.
Introduction

Following recent trends in psychological anthropology, this essay
combines ideas from cognitive science and psychoanalysis—an approach
Nuckolls (2001) calls “Deep Cognition”—to take a fresh look at ethnic
conflict between Czechs and Roma in the Czech Republic. A shift of
analytic focus from the objective structural and socio-political to the
subjective is worthwhile because it provides richer accounts of people’s
motives and actions than other approaches currently employed in social
science (Frank 2006; Nuckolls 2001; Ortner 2001). Both cognitive
science and psychoanalysis are interested in human development and
enculturation within particular cultural groups, and how such processes
shape human cognition, emotion, perception, motivation, and mental
health. In addition, both fields are interested in the way mental
representations of the self and other people are constructed and encoded,
which is of particular use for understanding interpersonal functioning.
Briefly, cognitive science focuses on information-encoding and
information-retrieval and provides a theory of thought by way of
organized knowledge structures—so called schemas and scripts—that
offer ready-made pathways for processing sensory information (Westen
2001). Simply put, learned patterns of information become properties of
the mind—with neural correlates—subsequently used to interpret and
reason about objects, persons, and events. People’s schemas reflect the
values and normative expectations of their social group, and these are
subsequently maintained through selective processing of information
(Monroe, Hanken, and Van Vechten 2000). In short, a thought is a
schematically organized perception.
Psychoanalysis, too, offers a theory about the creation of
consciousness by way of unconscious structures related to affective and
motivational processes, emphasizing the emotional significance of
information. It posits a “subjective unconscious” by which unconscious
feelings and fantasies shape, constitute, and give partial meaning to
conscious feeling and experience. In contrast to cognitive science, which
often compares the human brain to a computer and thought to information
processing—a distinctly objectivist and rationalist position—
psychoanalysis concludes that feeling states do not simply mirror external
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events; that we have subjective, not mechanical experiences of the
external world (Chodorow 1999:40; Bruner 1992; Elliott 2002). In fact,
according to psychoanalytic theory, subjectivity or “psychic reality” is
created through transference, a process whereby we use unconscious
experiences and feelings from the past to give partial meaning to the
present. One type of transference is projection, whereby we put feelings,
beliefs, or parts of our self onto an “other.” “I am angry at John” becomes
“John is angry at me” (D’Andrade: n.d.) Another type is introjection,
whereby aspects or functions of a person or an object are taken into the
self; for example, when children take in attitudes of parents, teachers,
heroes, and other significant people in their lives (Chodorow 1999:15). In
either case, cognitively-oriented social scientists now agree that
interpersonal encounters are more accurately understood as intersubjective encounters, characterized by transference and countertransference on the part of the interlocutors, and that the psychic
conditions of self-organization at any moment—that between an ethnic
Czech and a Rom, for example—involve powerful fantasies and anxieties
that shape each person’s self experience (Elliott 2002).
Nancy
Chodorow’s use of the term “interfantasy” to describe such encounters
seems particularly apt (1999:58).
The two fields thus agree that there is an unconscious.
Cognitivists, however, emphasize implicit, procedural knowledge, while
psychoanalysts are more interested in affects. Practitioners of both fields
agree that knowledge systems tend to begin organizing during specific
sensitive developmental periods and that childhood-derived systems of
knowledge influence the construction of adult propositions. Further,
selfhood is dynamic; every person’s self is the outcome of ongoing microhistorical processes—specifically, our social relations—that characterize
the constitution of the mind (Toren 2001). Self, Naomi Quinn states, is
“the totality of what an organism is physically, biologically,
psychologically, socially, and culturally” (2006:362). Ultimately, as the
psychological anthropologist and psychoanalyst, Douglas Hollan explains,
consciousness of ourselves and other things emerges by way of “a
complicated series of feedforward and feedback loops within a broad and
open system of information exchange [that] encompasses the synaptic
structure of the brain, intrapersonal processes of memory and symbol
formation, and interpersonal self-other configurations as organized and
shaped through familial, social, and historical processes” (2000:539).
Psychoanalysts label what goes on in a person-to-person or intersubjective
encounter, transference and countertransference; a relationship between
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information and internal models of self and other, leading to a unique,
contingent, emergent creation of intersubjective and intrapsychic
meanings (Hollan 2000: Chodorow 1999). Hollan explains that our many
and varied engagements in the world are “organized around self-other
configurations that slip into and out of awareness depending upon the
interpersonal matrices from which they emerge and with which they
become engaged” (2000:546). So, again, the mind is never a mere
reflection of outside events; rather, “impressions of the world are
constructed out of numerous and varied perceptions and self-states”
influenced by cultural and linguistic variables as well as “the creative and
imaginative capacities of individuals” (2000:542).
It will be surmised from the above that my approach relies on a
dualistic notion of culture as a set of common understandings manifest as
act and artifact (Bohannan 1995; Brumann 1999). It is in two places at
once: inside someone's head as understandings, and in the external
environment, embodied as a psychological state and a social construction
that includes intrapersonal and extrapersonal meaning (Strauss and Quinn
1997:16). In the present example, racism is a belief that resides in some
people’s heads; the discriminatory actions of racists constitute its public or
material dimension. One way in which culture is transmitted from one
person to another is when someone witnessing a racial act accepts and
adopts its premise.
Subsequently motivated by this newfound
understanding, she then goes on to commit her own act of racism.
Alternatively, the same person may recoil from the action and reject its
premise, thereafter becoming an advocate of racial tolerance. Culture’s
internal or private dimension—personal understandings or beliefs that
constitute one’s psyche—makes it a differentiating device; an indicator of
personal webs of meaning; hence, of a distinctive individual orientation
(Quinn 2005c). Its external or public dimension—symbols, structures,
and processes that shape and constrain our behaviors—makes it a
collective phenomenon, an aggregating device (Strauss and Quinn 1997).
Theory of Mind and Social Relations
A fresh approach to ethnic conflict (as well as racial and national
conflict) like the one I’m proposing is timely because many orthodox, socalled materialist or objectivist explanations of ethnicity and ethnic
conflict ignore a great deal of information.
Consequently, their
explanations are unsatisfying. Framed mostly in terms of modern, largescale, sociopolitical processes that cite economic decline and the loss of a
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way of life as causes of ethnogenesis —reflecting only culture’s outside
locus—they frequently downplay the fact that social forces are supported
by affective and emotional mechanisms that operate on both conscious
and unconscious levels. One consequence of this is that they suffer from
what is sometimes termed “groupism”—the tendency to assume that every
member of a group has the same ideas and expresses them by the same
means (Brubaker 2006; Kusserow 2004; Winant 2000).3 Groupist
accounts, in other words, assume that culture is shared, or evenly
distributed, among members of a group (Brumann 1999; Hannerz 1992).
Such monolithic views, in turn, lead to a presumption of collective
common purpose, which seriously mischaracterizes motivation as a
product of cultural codes and categories rather than of actors’ purpose and
desire. Consequently, human agency is reduced to little more than the
socio-culturally mediated capacity to act, with resistance to power and/or
utilitarian individualism being the most commonly cited examples of
action (Frank 2006; Nuckolls 2001:182). In short, so-called objective or
2

Wilmsen and McAllister et al. (1996:vii), are representative of this approach, as when
they insist that “ethnicity is always politically constructed and may arise anywhere and at
any time, not only when erected for its own purposes by an oppressive regime but more
frequently when individuals perceive a need to join in a consolidation of security through
shared identity in the face of economic, political, or other social forces.”
3

The neglect of subjectivity is rooted in methodological principles adopted a century ago
(Hirschfeld 2000; DiMaggio 1997). Then, social scientists were reluctant to portray
culture as the aggregate of individual subjectivities—a strategy known as methodological
individualism—due to the lack of method that would permit inferences about mental
functioning. Only external aspects of culture—so-called social facts—were deemed
amenable to direct measurement, and a strategy of methodological collectivism was
followed. The psychological facts of individuals—belief, desire, will, a sense of self, and
the ability to reason about means and ends—were left to psychologists. Twentiethcentury social scientists, however, gradually came to see that methodological
collectivism discounted actors with individual minds, implying as it does that persons
and selves are socially or culturally determined. The critique of method subsumed the
various forms of constructionism (cultural, social, political), which conceal the true
explanation behind people’s actions, namely, their beliefs and desires (Chodorow 2000;
Shweder 1995). In implying that history inheres in social structures, institutions,
ideologies, collective representations, cultural models, or social constructs, objectivist or
materialist arguments like those mentioned above give short shrift to subjectivity—to
motivation, emotion, and actors’ personal histories (Toren 2001:157). This
oversimplification is what caused E.P. Thompson (1978) to famously decry the telling of
history without a subject. It’s not that social formations don’t contribute to shaping,
organizing, and provoking modes of thought and feeling; it’s that people don’t sort neatly
into homogeneous groups whose putative members share collective intention. We are
not socio-culturally determined.
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materialist accounts of ethnic conflict are psychologically reductive.
Missing from them is sufficient consideration of the interior domain of
human life—individuality, personal idiosyncrasy, quirkiness, and
difference (Frank 2006)—and of the tension that exists between such
inner, personal, and outer, public worlds. In this paper, I take the side of
an increasing number of analysts from many academic disciplines who
favor the problematization of psychological functioning, for I agree
wholeheartedly with Roy D’Andrade that “any attempt to explain things at
the social and cultural level always assumes an account of psychological
processes” (D’Andrade:n.d.).
As has already been alluded to, and as will be further investigated
below, Deep Cognition solves many theoretical and empirical problems
and enables us to better understand ethnic and racial conflict and other
behaviors—chief among them, the problem of the relation between culture
and action, or motivation. It does so by probing the way people think and
feel—and also the way they feel about what they think (Luhrman 2006).
The focus on thought-feeling, or subjectivity, helps to broaden
understandings of ethnic and racial conflict such as that between Czechs
and Roma. As used above, the adjective “deep” implies that the brain
draws on and integrates both conscious and unconscious systems of
knowledge by way of a kind of parallel processing (Nuckolls 2001:184).
Conscious knowledge, sometimes referred to as explicit knowledge,
comprises schemas of cultural images, words, and action scenarios.
Unconscious knowledge, also known as implicit and/or subconscious
knowledge, comprises knowledge of procedures, as well as
representations of childhood interpersonal relationships and related affects
that are not consciously brought to mind, but which, nonetheless, shape
forever one’s impressions, including one’s sense of self, as well as one’s
expectations of others. Research on memory reveals that knowledge of
both types is stored in “associational networks,” the contents of which
vary according to people’s experiences.
For example, affective
associations—feelings, wishes, and fears—may be associated with
representations of abstract concepts, situations, or people. Such affects
may become activated along with other forms of information when part of
the network is primed by something in the environment or by thought
processes that touch on the network.
Consciousness, according to this model, results from feedback and
feedforward loops between the two cognitive subsystems whose units of
information are “associatively connected” or “networked” in the course of
learning and never erased (Hollan 2000; Westen 2001; Nuckolls 2001).
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The two subsystems comprise what Hollan calls (2000:539) a “selfsystem,” by way of which self-awareness is constructed out of one’s
ongoing engagements with the world, including, of course, those of the
interpersonal variety, such as those between Czechs and Roma.
D’Andrade labels this construction of consciousness “appraising”, which
he describes as a signal of match or mismatch of perceived events to
schemas that represent one’s expectations of the world based on his early
learning and personal experience (D’Andrade:n.d.). This system uses
sensory input and feedback from different inbuilt networks to produce
information about whether or not one is in familiar territory. Normally,
this happens automatically, without consciousness. Sometimes, however,
we encounter the unexpected and suddenly we experience a sensation or
feeling, what D’Andrade calls a “felt appraisal.” Felt appraisals generate
a combined feeling and thought, or affect, that vividly informs one about
one’s relation to the world and moves one to action. Accordingly, in
social encounters, one’s sense of self “emerges in interaction with other
people whose behavior deeply affects its constitution” (Hollan:2000:541).
Drew Westen (2001), another proponent of Deep Cognition, cites research
on associative memory that supports the model. To wit, a great deal of
implicit knowledge is stored along networks of association as we
unconsciously observe regularities in our experiences. In any social
encounter feelings, wishes, and fears associated with representations of
people become activated unconsciously along with other forms of
information as one part of the network is primed by something in the
environment or by thought processes that touch on the network. This is
Hebb’s Rule: neurons that fire together at one time will tend to fire
together in the future (Siegel 2001:26).
I demonstrate the efficacy of the analytical framework I’ve
presented thus far with a text I came across on the internet (Czechkid for
Teachers) in which a thoughtful, yet bewildered Rom teenager encounters
a young Czech mother carrying an infant in one arm, a suitcase in the
other, while being followed by two other small children at a tram station
in Prague. At the outset of his soliloquy he notes, “She was Czech, she
looked nice, about twenty-five years old.” The Czech family and Rom
teenager all disembark at the same stop, where a long steep staircase to the
outside awaits. The young man wants to offer his help; perhaps he could
hold the children’s hands as they climb the stairs? Whether he’s
motivated by chivalry or sympathy, the reader isn’t sure, although he
states that “Roma tend to be very courteous among themselves.” Still,
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however, he hesitates as a raucous debate takes place in his head, the text
of which gives readers a glimpse into the workings of his mind:
How should a black gypsy address this Czech woman, who
probably has prejudices against Roma people and against
foreigners in general, especially late at night in a deserted
underpass? What would she say? She would say, ‘Well,
thank you very much, that’s very kind.’ Or might she think
I wanted to chat her up? Or perhaps she would think
worse things? What would I do if she started to scream
when I approached her and offered her help? Or am I
interpreting the whole thing badly? How much negative
and defamatory stuff is written about the Roma people?
Here we see a rich example of subjectivity as the young man
constructs a host of thoughts based both on real experience and sheer
conjecture. Psychoanalysts refer to this as the emotional construction of
selfhood: “individuals structure themselves out of present and past
relationships as mediated through intense desires, identifications, and
repressions” (Elliott 2002:6). Not knowing what the woman is actually
thinking, he infers and surmises, constructing a fantasy that has its basis
more in his own knowledge and emotions than on actuality. His
interpretations momentarily meet his deep needs for connection and
validation. As described above, the thought process involves transference
and projection. He is aware that some Czechs feel hatred and fear toward
those whose skin color is similar to his. Being a young male, he is also
aware of the possibility that any female-directed gesture on his part might
be misconstrued. Nonetheless, he is hopeful that this particular kindlooking woman will be different; that she will give him an opportunity to
show that he is different; that he is kind and trustworthy, and that she will
be appreciative of his help. Why he finds her “nice looking” is unclear.
Perhaps she appears upright; perhaps he is physically attracted to her. He
feels culturally and personally obligated to offer assistance and is feeling
guilt even before he makes his decision. He seems to want simply to be
able to express his feelings naturally, to be free of the agonizing
ambivalence that he feels deprives him of his humanity. This encounter
represents an opportunity to change people’s opinions, indeed, to change
himself. Ultimately, however, he withdraws due to the insecurity he feels
which is based on the knowledge he has accumulated about such crosscultural encounters. His calculations seem to have convinced him that the
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odds of his good deed turning out badly outweigh those of it turning out
well. And instantly he feels regret and shame:
Just after midnight I had suddenly found myself in a
situation in which there might be an explosion of
prejudices. A whole minute went by. I went around her, as
though not intending anything, as though I hadn’t noticed
her plight. Like an impolite animal on two legs, I simply
continued along the entire platform, leaving the suitcase,
children, and her behind. I ran down the concrete steps,
taking two by two, and then up the other side, until I was
amongst the houses. A cold wind blew from the underpass.
Perhaps this woman hadn’t had any prejudices. . . . If you
don’t have such prejudices, dear woman, then I really did
you an injustice and failed you. And your children. And
myself. In these night hours, I buried my courtesy. Today
and now, I promise: Whenever I find myself again in such
a situation, I shall certainly offer my assistance, regardless
of how the other person reacts. And then my courtesy will
certainly return to me.
I have more to say about this particular incident below. For now,
however, let me simply repeat that cognition is not as straightforward as
the popular analogies to computing or information processing might
suggest. Far from being a simple computation or decoding, meanings are
elaborate interpretations evoked in a person by an object or event.
Interpretations draw upon culture as well as people’s experiences and
feelings from the past to give partial meaning to the present (Hollan
2000:541; Chodorow 1999:14). An analysis of ethnic conflict that attends
to cognition, emotion, and motivation avoids groupism—i.e., assumptions
of mass intersubjectivity—and enables us to understand ethnic conflict in
ways that are far more satisfying than the more typical approaches that
focus on the role of large-scale socio-political processes. For example, we
can more fruitfully address the following issues: Are all Czechs racist, or
just some of them? Which ones are, and why these particular ones? Do
they hate all Roma, or just some? Again, why? How can we account for
similarity and difference? More generally, what makes people political?
What makes them value social relations? We cannot answer these
questions with standard social theories. Understanding the intricacies of
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cognition, however, enables us to better appreciate the complexity that
exists in any society.
The remainder of my argument will proceed as follows: in the
next part of the paper (Part III), I will discuss the background of this
project, how I became interested in Czech-Roma antipathy, and how I
conceived a strategy for investigating the problem. In Part IV, I will share
excerpts from seven of the student narratives I collected, narratives which,
I believe, clearly support a methodological and theoretical focus on
discourse analysis and subjectivity as critical research strategies in any
study of ethnic conflict. The data in this set of narratives also enable me
to sketch a portrait of Czech ethnopsychology—the way, that is, that most
Czechs understand such psychological issues as mind, self, body, and
emotion. As Poole observes, “Concepts of the person and ideas of folk
psychology are mutually implicated in descriptions and explanations of
the culturally significant lineaments of human thought, feeling, and
action” (1985:184).
Although I am not ordinarily an ethnographer of
Czech culture, I draw upon Ladislav Holy’s (1996) rich insights to explore
Czech cultural models of personhood, self, and other, so as to understand
how many Czechs assess the social world. I will also discuss child
development and socialization, the process by which some, but not all,
Czech children acquire these models. Following up on this discrepancy,
in the fifth part of the paper, I will explore additional data that illustrates
intra-cultural variation. Finally, in Part VI, I will bring the discussion to a
conclusion.
Background and Method
My deep probe of Czech-Roma ethnic conflict is possible only
because of an unusual source of data I collected as a visiting professor at
Palacky University, in Olomouc, Czech Republic, in 2002. Assigned to
teach a class in race and ethnicity that semester, I decided to exploit what I
assumed my students already knew well, namely, the acrimonious social
relations between Czechs and Roma. My hope was that my students’
empirical familiarity with ethnic conflict would facilitate their theoretical
mastery of this complex social problem. As lessons got underway, I was
encouraged to find a classroom full of critical thinkers, all of whom were
23-24 years old at the time, which would have made them all between 11
and 12 when the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact collapsed. As will be
seen, such dating is helpful for understanding how my students
experienced themselves and how they understood others at the time of my
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visit. Having but a cursory understanding of the Czech-Roma issue
myself, mostly of the macro, socio-political, objective sort, I was desirous
of more of an “emic,” or insider’s, perspective of the situation. So, I
decided to begin the class by asking the students to recall for me, in
writing, their first encounters with Roma; the first time, that is, that they
became aware that their society made distinctions between its various
members on the basis of ethnicity. Their accounts were to take the form
of two-to-three pages of first-person narrative, and students were urged to
avoid academic jargon and theoretical speculation.
With this simple strategy in place I hoped to be able to take the
class quickly beyond mechanistic explanations of ethnic conflict and to
gain insight into the kinds of encounters that occurred between Czechs
and Roma. By eliciting personal narratives I hoped to discover the
connections between cultural and mental processes and thereby gain
insight into ordinary motivation. I hoped to discover in my students’
reasoning the mental structures—schemas and affects—used by Czechs
like my students to interpret Roma.4 My reading was guided by the
following questions: Who were the actors—what was their age, their
gender, their socioeconomic status? What everyday plots developed
between Czechs and Roma? How did Czechs and Roma enter into the
imaginations of one another? And how did things typically go wrong?
What did the people involved in the interactions think and feel? 5 And
finally, can social theory capture this complexity?
The twenty-five accounts of Czechs’ “formative encounters” with
Roma that I collected—a total of sixty pages of written narrative—turned
out to be chock full of psycho-cultural information that changed my own
theoretical orientation dramatically, showing me that there was no such
thing as a typical Czech, a typical Rom, or a typical encounter. To the
contrary, there seemed to be, rather, an infinite number of possible
dramas, each depending on the particular self-other interpersonal matrix
that plays out when one person engages with another (Hollan 2000:541).
4

Incidentally, I believe that my students’ writing in a second or third language was not
entirely disadvantageous as some might expect. I believe it limited their ability to evade
or soften events, and that as a consequence, they wrote with more honesty.
5
Ironically, I was most curious about the very existential conditions I was least adept at
explaining. An economic anthropologist, I had been trained to look for structural
explanations of identity politics, usually by way of quantitative data. In fact, like most
social scientists of my generation, I had been admonished to eschew psychology because
of its methodological limitations and its inability to connect external and subjective
aspects of culture (DiMaggio 1997).
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Before I get to the analysis I would like to discuss the methodology by
which I make sense of my data. The method I employ is the “cultural
analysis of discourse,” which its inventor, Naomi Quinn, describes as an
effort to reconstruct, from spoken or written language, the underlying
cultural assumptions that shape our thoughts and our ability to reason
(2005a:3-4). Quinn frequently cites socio-linguist, Charlotte Linde
(1993), who has been eliciting and analyzing life stories throughout her
career. Linde asserts that personal narratives contain a great deal of
psycho-cultural information; they express who we are and how we got that
way, in short, how we construct selves. She says that we use stories to
enhance and communicate this sense of self and negotiate it with others.
As we do so, Linde argues, we stake our claim to membership in a group
and try to show that we are worthy members (see also O’Nell 1996:146).
Strauss and Quinn (1997:9 assert that such information goes a long way in
clarifying issues of identity and interpersonal relations, for it testifies to
the fact that identity is neither predetermined and fixed nor entirely
constructed and fluid.
This perspective offers vital insight for
understanding ethnic conflict between Czechs and Roma.
With its focus on individuals, this method breaks with the
customary methodological collectivism of conventional social science.
One advocate explains that “the point is not that one individual’s
knowledge structure represents all of culture in the microcosm, but that
social action is the result of a process by which public events are turned
into private representations and acted on, thereby creating new public
events, and we need a better understanding of how this happens” (Strauss
1992:16). Quinn believes that eliciting copious amounts of discourse or
talk via extended interviews or other means enables the cognitively
oriented social scientist to discern the cultural meanings that organize the
thoughts of the interviewee or raconteur and also the way the interviewee
or raconteur reasons about various things; how, in short, people frame and
reflect upon their every experience prior to taking any particular action.
Bloch (Hirschfeld 2000:621) agrees that the basis of cognition can be
discovered in the analysis of the style and contents of narrative, while
DiMaggio (1997:266) and Strauss (1992:16) call discourse analysis an
ingenious technique that allows strong inferences of mental structures,
which are key to connecting external and subjective aspects of culture.
Expounding on the rationale behind the method, Quinn (2005a)
explains that there is much about culture that cannot be articulated by its
users. People come by their knowledge both as a result of formal teaching
and real life experiences, and in the latter case, people's explanations for
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their own actions often remain ambiguous. A methodological focus on
discourse, she argues (2005a:4), allows us to reconstruct what actors know
and how they know it, as well as what knowledge they lack, and the ways
in which they do not or cannot know—information from which
researchers can deduce the reason for their actions. Strauss concurs,
saying that “some feeling states are imperfectly conveyed by verbal
description, but if we are to attempt to understand others’ lives from their
point of view, their words are indispensable” (1992:16). Insight into the
thought process, especially in regard to motivation, can help us extend our
understanding of agency beyond such simplistic notions as the socioculturally mediated capacity to act (Frank 2006:282).
The Data
In this section, I present seven excerpts of what I call my students’
“formative encounters of Roma” to illustrate both the quality and utility of
this data for analyzing social relations along the lines I discussed above. I
believe these data illustrate the process by which many young Czechs
internalize cultural models—archetypes—of both Czech and Roma
personhood by virtue of constant exposure to and regular participation in
Czech society. How, that is, they define and subsequently discern normal
and abnormal behavior and come to emulate or eschew it, as the case may
be, while learning, too, that the word cizinec applies to people who exhibit
non-Czechness, a situation that often provokes a feeling of unease.6 For
editorial reasons, I’m limited to these few examples, so I have attempted
to select carefully those passages that best illustrate the cognitive sciencepsychoanalytic synthesis that I am advocating in this article. In the
interest of protecting people’s identities, all of the names used below have
been changed.

Excerpt 1: Jana
My first experience of seeing gypsies was in Slovakia. I
remember traveling there and seeing a real gypsy village.
It was always so interesting to look, if only for a moment,
6

Cizinec is a derivation of “cizi,” foreign, which has a number of meanings ranging from
alien, unfamiliar, different, to strange. Above all, says von Kunes (1999:84), what is cizi
is hard to identify with.
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from the passing train. It was a round village with the
houses—if you could call them that—made of mud and
wood somehow. I always wondered why they didn’t fall
apart. In the middle of the village there was always a fire
burning, and it was very lively. There were naked kids
running around, with muddy hands in their mouths,
watching the train. Sometimes we got to see women with
long skirts and scarves cooking on the fire or washing
clothes in a brownish pond beside the village, apparently
the only water available. Lightly dressed men brought
wood to keep the fire going. The village seemed to be
constantly in motion—people, pigs, and hens—and there
was mud and rubbish all around. From my point of view,
this was an unlivable place and if I ever misbehaved, my
parents would tease me, saying that if I didn’t stop, they
would sell me to the gypsies.
Excerpt 2: Katka
I had a good overview from the window in my bedroom and
I could watch them. There was a fireplace in front of their
house. Gypsy women preferred to cook outside in a big pot
which was much bigger than the biggest one in our kitchen
was. One day we had some visitors and I called them to
come to my bedroom to see the gypsies. We could see the
water in the big pot boiling and then an old gypsy woman
came out of the house and threw a few big pieces of bloody
meat into the pot. This happened when I was eight years
old and we had bought our first pet—a black poodle called
Betty. It took a long time to persuade my father to buy her.
I was a shy child and did not have many friends, so Betty
meant a great deal to me. My father told me and my sister
not to leave Betty in the garden alone. He told us that
some gypsies eat dogs. He visited a gypsy village in
Slovakia and saw them killing and then eating a dog. I
became afraid about Betty. I did not want my dog to be
eaten up by those gypsies. I became worried and angry.
Every time I had to pass their house, I ran. I wished they
would disappear or move away.
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What can one deduce from these narratives? Let me offer a few
preliminary observations beginning with the obvious. Czech society is
highly segregated. Entire regions, as well as many cities and towns are
ethnically homogeneous, as are many institutions.7 So, for many Czechs,
a glimpse from a passing train or a distant bedroom window is as close as
they will ever come to Roma. In fact, many of my students reported that
they didn’t encounter “others” until well into childhood. Such children
might be described as ethnically “aschematic,” in the sense that they lack
schemas for national and ethnic categories other than their own, and
scripts for interethnic relations (Baldwin 1992). Consequently, they do
not yet distinguish; they do not yet discriminate. They don’t know yet
what to make of the difference they observe; what to feel; how to react.
They simply do not have the mental faculties to categorize ethnic others.
Indeed, in the narratives above, there is ample evidence of a prior
curiosity, amusement, amazement, and even the suggestion of sympathy
for the odd strangers. There is also evidence of ambivalence and
anxiety—of simply not knowing how to interpret the scene—although we
can see ethnocentric parents seizing the opportunity to shape their
children’s impressions by way of inculcating negative affects, namely,
contempt and fear, which may be recalled or transferred later in life when
Jana and Katka find themselves in the presence of ethnic others. Strauss
and Quinn (1997) tell us that isolation and provincialism act as
“centripetal forces” on culture, social organization, and history itself.
That is, they act to preserve the socio-cultural status quo for the simple
reason that isolated people don’t attain new information that might
disconfirm their assumptions. In the absence of social interaction,
meanings cannot be contested and renegotiated (Ortner 2001). Cultural
models of self, other, and relations between self and other remain static
and antagonistic. Those Czechs who experience little diversity firsthand
are likely to remain biased, unable to see that their perspective is an aspect
of their selves rather than an essential quality of Roma (Bohannan
1995:38). National culture and traditions, aspects of culture’s public or
external dimension, thus have a profound centripetal effect on how people
experience themselves, as well as how they understand others.
There’s another lesson here, as well; one that concerns cultural
transmission. We can discern in Jana’s and Katka’s narratives the outside7

Among the Roma, 75% of working-age adults are unemployed, 80% of Roma children
attend remedial schools, and there is a near complete absence of Roma representation in
government (Slavikova 2011).
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inside flow of culture; that is, someone who has internalized public—in
this case, nationalist—discourses, will come to share, to a certain extent,
such meanings. When people behave according to these now-personal
meanings, they publicly manifest the meaning whereupon any witnesses
may confirm—or alter—their own cultural understandings of the nation.
Of course, there are other discourses circulating in Czech society, such as
those that center on human rights and Roma rights.
Tellingly, when I tried to discuss segregation and discrimination in
class, I drew the immediate ire of students who simply didn’t want to
consider structural inequalities or their possible role in perpetuating them.
Most attributed high unemployment among Roma to laziness, rather than
to discrimination, and low achievement in education to a lack of intellect
and/or ambition, not to the fact that Roma children are often placed in
special schools because they do not speak Czech. Some students became
quite heated in defense of themselves and even more strident in their
denunciations of Roma, and to my dismay, a few of them even quit the
class. One observed “I must confess that if I meet a Rom now, I am rather
suspicious.” And she went on to say, “But I am not a racist. . . . I simply
refuse to be called a racist, and I believe the majority of Czechs aren’t
racists. Hope so.” (Excerpt C). Another stated that “what the white
people don’t like is that in spite of their long stay in our country, gypsies
still can’t speak Czech, and they still don’t simulate our way of life; they
have too many children but they don’t work; they only come for the social
benefits.” And she added, “I don’t know if relations between us and
gypsies will be better, but I hope so” (Excerpt K).
In addition to outright denials like these, there was a good deal of
scapegoating in the data, not only of Roma themselves, but also of
Communists, Soviets, and Westerners. One student observed, “It seems
that Roma are one of the greatest problems in the Czech Republic
nowadays, at least in the eyes of other countries. It is difficult to say what
I think about them because my opinions are much shaped by the media. I
would probably be called racist or xenophobic if I say they are just dirty,
uneducated thieves. It’s just not politically correct” (Excerpt M).8
Similar sentiments were voiced by other students:

8

The frequently invoked charge of political correctness provides additional evidence of
my students’ defensiveness and overall ambivalence about Czech attitudes toward
minorities.
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“A negative view of Gypsies was extended by the
consensus that was present in the Czech majority.
According to it, Gypsies were dirty, lazy, slapdash, and
thieves. Hardly anyone realized that the mutual distrust
and misunderstanding came for the faulty Communist
policy that did not solve the problem and caused
segregation and isolation of Gypsies” (Excerpt F).
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“Another aspect of communist policy resented by
the majority was social welfare which promoted a higher
birth rate in the Gypsy community—while the average
Czech family has two or three children, Gypsy families
often have four, five, or even more” (Excerpt N).
Having only recently regained their sovereignty, my students—like
many of their compatriots—were in no mood to hear Czech national
culture being disparaged, even in the context of European Union
membership in which discussions of human rights were common. They
were fed up with outsiders’ criticisms and prescriptions, and they became
defensive—even hostile—with those who did not see the Roma issue their
way. Suddenly, in class, I became a villain. A cizinec. But though I was
saddened that our initial esprit de corps was gone, I was even more
puzzled by my students’ sudden unwillingness to question things; after all,
in most other ways, they were astute, evenhanded, and compassionate.
The turn of events provoked a change of approach, causing me to
become what Quinn (2005a:6) calls a methodological opportunist; that is,
one who seeks data by unconventional means. Taking a cue from a
variety of researchers such as Jan Penrose (Harrison 2006:53) and Michel
Foucault (Scheper-Hughes 2001:73), I considered the possibility that the
particular stereotypes that people hold of others in fact reveal much about
the way they wish to define themselves; that stereotypes actually testify to
the repressed fears, longings, and insecurities of the in-group; that the
search for scapegoats constitutes a way of emphasizing the normalcy of
the in-group; and that the kind of scapegoat that people invent depends on
the particular behavior that members of a society are most concerned to
disavow (see also Obeyesekere 1984:108). By this deeper logic, Roma
serve as a repository for Czechs’ disowned and frightening aggressive
feelings, while Czechs, themselves, are idealized and seen as good and
admirable (Sherwood 1980). In fact, Ladislav Holy (1996) confirms this
when he writes that Czechs have a history of desire to be acknowledged
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by other Europeans for their cultural achievements. Such recognition
hasn’t been forthcoming, he says, because of foreign domination, first, by
the Hapsburgs, then, the Germans, and most recently, the Soviets.
Other commentators express similar thoughts. Historian Jiri Staif
(2005) asserts that Czech self-understandings have been influenced by the
writings of nineteenth century Czech historians, whose interpretations of
history reflected (1) the Enlightenment conviction that the telling of
history not be confined to political events, but that it should also consider
the history of civilization and progress; (2) the Romantic Period’s notion
that history was about nations—unique ethnic wholes occupying a
territory; and (3) the classical German philosophy bias that regarded the
state as the highest form of civilization. Journalist Jan Culik (2000) writes
that modern (i.e., 19th century) Czech society defined itself defensively
against the mostly Germanic world as a narrow, homogeneous, enclosed
community, an attitude that strengthened during decades of communism,
when the regime exploited Czech nationalism to foment xenophobia
against those who came from the outside world. This history promotes a
profound sense of inadequacy and a national identity crisis. Viewed in a
new light, scapegoating can be seen as what Quinn calls a “task solution”
(Strauss and Quinn 1997:122). This permits racists to displace their own
negative thought-feelings onto Roma; as such, scapegoating serves to
rationalize and justify Czech hatred and disgust, and this is one reason for
the durability of identity (ethnic) conflict.
Returning to the data, in both excerpts, we obtain a
phenomenological account of cultural difference. In Number 1, the
narrator, Jana, identifies many of the material or objective markers that
distinguish Roma in the eyes of Czechs: the circular village, the houses of
mud and wood, the fire, the naked kids with muddy hands, the women in
long skirts and scarves, the brown pond, the lightly dressed men, the
wood, pigs, hens, mud, and rubbish. Her mention of these various objects
indicates that none of them are part of the “cognitive background” of
ordinary Czechs—the things that most Czechs learn implicitly by virtue of
the objective and practical regularities in their own society; the implicit
knowledge that constitutes the habitus of most Czechs (D’Andrade:n.d.;
Strauss and Quinn 1997:24). Jana’s observations affirm Paul Bohannan’s
(1995:21) observation that in the process of learning culture, people come
to regard the particular version of it that they learn—i.e., their own
culture—as a part of the natural world; the world they take for granted; the
world they become enchanted by. By logical extension, that which is not
natural is unnatural, and that which is unnatural is likely to be considered

Roma and Czechs: Mindful of Difference
19
fascinating or dangerous. Such appraising, of course, is a crucial aspect of
humans’ evolutionary design. It is what has made our species so
successful. Commonplace things evoke no conscious response, nor do
they arouse any feeling, and people go about their business efficiently.9
But because they are unfamiliar to her, she is aware of them; she is
conscious of them. That is, they evoke feelings or affects in her. And
what feelings are they? At this stage, the young girl is curious; her gaze is
full of fascination. At the same time, one senses that she is confused
about the social implications of what she sees; not yet having a firm
conviction—and/or perhaps accommodating contradictory beliefs, e.g., a
distaste for deviance, but also compassion for suffering people—she
“wonders” about the dirty, shivering people living in hovels, information
that does not match her expectations. Young Jana experiences fascination
and disgust simultaneously; sympathy tinged with surprise; anxiety. We
see much the same thing in the second narrative where the narrator, Katka,
recalls the outdoor kitchen, the big pot, the fresh meat. Katka is
alternately anxious, indignant, amused, smug; in a word, ambivalent. As
both girls mature, however, they will learn to be consistent in their
assessments by observing and associating with other competent Czechs.
This mental tallying of contrast between familiar and exotic
objects all adds up for the phenomenologically-inspired anthropologist for
whom external objects are the source of meaning. For such analysts,
meaning is the essential property of the cultural object alone, and
intentionality is simply a mental state directed toward or deriving from
objects or entities outside oneself.
Psychoanalytically-inspired
anthropologists have a very different view of how the mind works; that it
is meaningfully influenced by unconscious thoughts, affects, and motives.
(Clarke 1999; Chodorow 1999; Paul 1989). For them, perception is less a
process of decoding than one of transference; less a reflection of reality
than a refraction of it. Everything and everyone we experience, we
experience from the unique perspective of idiosyncratic selves: we have
subjective impressions derived from multiple and personal schemas and
affects; not “real” in any sense. Rather, they are distortions, personal
fantasies, in fact, more reflective of personal subjectivity than of any
object's presumed "essence."
9

Regarding efficiency, cognitivists speak of the “cognitive economy” by which they
mean the managing of one's mental resources, including time, effort and specific
processing tools. Performance declines when one performs tasks that require more
resources than are available but stereotypes decrease the information processing load
(Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000).
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The implication here is that there is no such thing as an external
enemy; Czech-Rom interpersonal/intersubjective relations are organized
around the habitual patterns of interaction and expectation each
interlocutor has used in previous significant relationships from as long ago
as early childhood (Paul 1989; Hollan 2000). Accordingly, all perception
of an enemy is a projection of the ego as the enemy (Clarke 1999;
Sherwood 1980). With this theoretical insight, we move beyond
deterministic theories that prioritize public or extrapersonal meanings, and
we become more aware of intrapersonal meanings and their associated
affects—in short, of subjectivity and intersubjectivty—as the codeterminants of consciousness (Strauss and Quinn 1997). Consciousness
is equivalent to an interpretation rather than a computation; the product of
intrapersonal meaning and extrapersonal meaning. It involves an
identification of the object, person, or event, expectations regarding it,
and, often, a feeling about it and a motivation to respond to it (7). And the
transactional nature of social interaction becomes clearer: our encounters
are the emergent products of transference and countertransference (Hollan
2000; Chodorow 1999). Thus, meaning-making or “making sense” is
equivalent to an interpretation evoked in a person by an object or event at
a given time (Strauss and Quinn 1997:6). As mentioned previously,
D’Andrade labels this construction of consciousness an “appraisal”.
Appraisals such as these compel the agentive self to make decisions, to
take action. Excerpt Number 2 illustrates the development of affective
personal meanings related to ethnicity. Katka begins to associate Roma
with feelings of fear, anger, and contempt, negative affects that lead to
prejudice against and avoidance of Roma. One gains more insight into
this development in the following three excerpts—numbers 3, 4, and 5—
wherein we see that the naïveté and ambivalence of the children are
replaced by a greater decisiveness and the result is less acceptance of
difference.
Excerpt 3: Vitek
The first time I remember Roma was in Prague. I was five
years old when we made a trip there. We sat in a subway
train and two men got in and sat right opposite me. They
smelled very bad. I asked my Mum why they smelled and if
they were brown from the sun. She said they were gypsies
and that that was their normal color, and they did not wash
themselves. I asked her why they did not wash, and she
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said that they were not used to washing and that they did
not mind their bad smell. So in my child’s brain, gypsies
were connected with smelling bad. And this memory I have
had for nearly twenty years.
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Excerpt 3 retraces five-year-old Vitek’s newfound ability to
distinguish people by way of the formation of an idiosyncratic model of
Roma.
Interestingly, his appraising of others includes olfactory
information; below, we will see that knowledge can be encoded in other
sensory modalities as well—visual, haptic, kinesthetic, auditory or
gustatory (Throop 2003). Vitek’s trusted mother, though seemingly
sympathetic to the Roma men’s plight—she does not condemn them—
nonetheless does not think her young son is quite ready for a lesson in
Czechoslovakian political economy. So, she opts for a simple, nonpolitical explanation—lackadaisical gypsies, dirty and smelling badly, but
living life as they choose—and we see how this representation becomes an
enduring aspect of Vitek’s problem solving or reasoning; how, that is, it
comes to constitute a significant aspect of his personality or self-system.
To wit, for the next twenty years he associates Roma with filth and a lack
of self-respect, a conviction that arouses disgust and promotes a sense of
superiority that presumably develops further into a sense of ethnic and
national identities. The cognitivist adage that “ethnicity is not a thing in
this world but rather a perspective on it” (Brubaker 2004:17) is clearly
illustrated through this and the next example.
Excerpt 4: Petr
I come from a little village in North Moravia where there
were no gypsies at all, but that doesn’t mean that I did not
come across any of them. I recall two early impressions.
One was that they were the source of jokes, like, ‘Do not be
lazy like a gypsy,’ or, ‘You are as filthy as only a gypsy can
be.’ I thought of them as strange people who eat squirrels
and cats, and I imagined fat, loud women in tattered
dresses and dirty kids playing in the mud. And if I ever met
any, I would not look into their eyes because I thought
there was something wild and devilish inside. My parents
would never allow us to play with gypsy kids.
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Excerpt 4 offers more evidence of the mediating role of cultural
and personal knowledge in organizing sensory inputs.
Negative
connotations of Roma were formed by way of oft-heard jokes during early
learning, and thereafter reinforced by people’s ordinary speech acts and
routine practices.10 Roma were objects of ridicule and not to be taken
seriously. Petr overlearned the negative stereotype to the point of
automaticity, such that any ontological alternatives to this racist fantasy
were out of the question. Since then, this understanding has continually
influenced Petr’s assessments and actions. Any residual curiosity from
early childhood is seemingly all gone. He has become another Czech
adult who will have nothing to do with Roma, testimony to the fact that
the oppressive representation of Roma is widely distributed in the Czech
Republic.
Excerpt 5: Helena
When I was eight years old, I was going to school with only
white children and I thought that dark-colored people only
lived in Africa. One day, we were told that a new student
would be coming the following week. Living in a small
village, where life moves slower, meeting someone new
brought great excitement. The day arrived, and what a
surprise it was when our teacher introduced Erzika, a
dark-colored girl. When she sat down at her desk every
single eye in the class was gazing at her. When we had our
break, all of the children went to her desk and asked her
who she was, where she came from, and why her skin was
a different color. The questions might sound silly, but we
were very interested little kids. There was no prejudice, no
hatred or mean looks. We were innocent children who just
wanted to find out about our new friend. We didn’t know
that some people prefer the white race or that some dislike
gypsies. Even though she was shy, Erzika seemed like a
nice person, the same as the rest of us, only with a different
color of skin. The next day, however, the behavior of
several children suddenly changed. They were mean to
Erzika, making fun of the way she looked and calling her
10

Joking behavior is much studied in anthropology. Among other things, jokes are
related to social control and the management of conflict (Goody 1977).
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names. I didn’t understand how they could behave so
horribly towards her or how they could change overnight.
A few years later, I talked to my parents about this incident
and they explained to me that what probably happened was
that, when the children went home and told their parents
about the new student, the parents undoubtedly told their
children many reasons why gypsies do not belong in our
society. Their parents taught them to hate someone who
had been a friend and the children’s behavior changed.
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Here, Helena reveals an abrupt change of behavior among some of
her eight-year-old classmates. Again, the scene is a remote, ethnically
homogeneous village, and the children are naïve in matters of ethnic
identity. But the unexpected arrival of the dark-skinned Erzika prompts
some of the children’s parents to impart a critical lesson in ethnic labeling
(Rogoff 2003; Quinn 2005c). Very quickly—overnight, in fact—some of
the children learn that their new classmate belongs in a separate category
from themselves and that as a “gypsy” she does not warrant their
solicitousness, but rather their scorn.11 It is a message that will be
repeated again and again, both explicitly and tacitly, until a model of
personhood is constructed along the lines described by sociologists Alena
Nedomova and Tomas Kostelecky.12 A typical Czech, they write,
is represented by a Czech-speaking person of Czech
citizenship and Czech origin, living in the same
town/village or at least not far from his/her birthplace, has
a close relationship with his/her place of residence and not
willing to move anywhere, especially not far from his/her
home country. . . . This person has no personal experience
with living abroad [so] it is not surprising that his/her
11

One wonders how the shy Erzika dealt with this situation—did she transfer to a
remedial school as some of my other students in similar situations reported? And did she
internalize or come to identify herself with the distortions of her classmates, much as the
young Rom described in section two did? Projective identification occurs when negative
feelings are forced into others with the result that the recipient is induced to feel or act in
ways that originate with the projector (Clarke 1999).
12

Notions of Czech self and Rom other are purveyed by way of popular culture, of
course, as well as by national historiography (Staif 2005), the theater (Lemon 1996), and
television productions of various kinds, e.g., post-Czechoslovakia debates (Leudar and
Nekvapil 2000).
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attitudes towards foreigners generally (and immigrants in
particular) can be described with words such as “fear,”
“caution,” or “mistrust.” [1997:81]
This notion of ethnic or national typicality is important for this
essay; recall from above that cultural models inform our judgment and
that our social encounters are mediated by memories of previous self-other
configurations (Hollan 2000). It becomes critical to know, then, what
constitutes the average Czech’s cognitive background with regard to the
category of person. We must try to understand the standard or model of
proper personhood against which Eva, Honza, and other Czechs are
assessing their sensory input. In addition to the information provided by
Nedomova and Kostelecky, Czech sociologist Jiri Musil (1998) provides a
glimpse into Czech national character vis-à-vis those of its Central
European neighbors:
In comparison with Hungarians and to a certain extent with
Austrians, Czechs are more restrained and careful. Czechs
are also more skeptical, selective, and serious—they tend to
weigh different aspects of an issue. Czechs are also
considered to be very practical and to be the hardest
working out of these three nations. . . . [These] are
basically bland characteristics which—even when spiced
up with the typical Czech sense of humor and irony—do
not particularly attract or provoke anyone. Everything is
somewhat unpronounced. The Czech mentality carries
within it a strange, albeit understandable, paradox. All of
the revolutions and shocks of modern Czech history, the
pettiness of some Czechs and the bravery of others, led to
the formation of a mentality that has no clear edges or
contours. . . . Restraint linked with stubbornness have
crystallized into thought processes, attitudes, values, and
lifestyles that are relatively stable and functional.
A more detailed description of what Czechs expect of a person is
provided by social anthropologist Holy, a one-time Czechoslovak, who
lived much of his life in exile in Great Britain. Holy returned to his
homeland to conduct a study of political subjectivity leading up to the
breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1993. Among other things, he was struck
by the fervent nationalism of his erstwhile countrymen, and the particular
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ethnoconcept of Czech personhood. Czech national identity, he says,
differs qualitatively from the identities that individuals assume on the
basis of their achieved statuses:
It is ‘superordinate to most other statuses, and defines the
permissible constellation of statuses, or social personalities, which an
individual with that identity may assume.’ It is an imperative identity
‘in that it cannot be disregarded or temporarily set aside by other
definitions of the situation.’ It resembles gender identity or identity
determined by one’s age in that it too is seen as something naturally given.
When talking about Czechness on the whole, people mentioned three
criteria: having been born in the Czech lands, speaking Czech as one’s
mother tongue, and having been born of Czech parents. Whilst some of
them mentioned all three criteria, most were of the opinion that having
been born in the Czech lands and speaking Czech were not enough to
make one a Czech. Hardly anyone thought that those gypsies or Jews who
were born in the Czech lands, and who sometimes spoke only Czech, were
Czechs, and most people asserted quite strongly that ‘someone who
speaks Czech is not necessarily a Czech: a Czech-speaking gypsy is not a
Czech.’ Many people spoke of ‘Czech gypsies’ or ‘Czech Jews,’ but
particularly as far as gypsies were concerned they vehemently denied the
possibility that they could become Czechs. ‘A gypsy will always remain a
gypsy’ was a phrase I heard many times. [1996:72]
Elsewhere, Holy constructs an archetypal character he calls “the
little Czech man”—in Czech, Maly Cesky Clovek, or MCC—to depict the
average Czech. The MCC, Holy reports,
is not motivated by great ideals. His lifeworld is delineated
by his family, work, and close friends, and he approaches
anything that is outside it with caution and mistrust. His
attitude is down-to-earth, and he is certainly no hero . . . .
The little Czech as the ideal member of the nation has roots
in national mythology. The Czech nation survived three
hundred years of oppression not because of its heroes but
because of the little Czechs who were the nation. . . . The
little Czech, the representative of the everyday and the
ordinary, is the role model, and what is important about
him as a role model is that he lacks individuation. . . . The
reluctance to individuate persons is manifest in the Czech
custom of addressing people by their occupational roles. . .
. What this usage emphasizes, however, is not one’s role in
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the complex division of labor but the denial of
individuation and the stress on identity deriving from
category membership. It is an expression of the importance
of the collective (in this case the categorical) identity over
the personal one. [Holy 1996:62]
It can be seen throughout this analysis that labels necessarily imply
some similarity among those within a given category and some difference
between members of one category and members of another. As such, they
encourage thinking in terms of in-groups and out-groups; that is, they abet
political subjectivity.13 Without them, as can be inferred from the above,
there is no object of general hatred (Greenberg, Kirkland, and Pyszczynski
1988). Something else that can be inferred from Helena’s account is that
along with learning the distinguishing criteria or the objective markers—
skin tone, hair color and texture, surname and given name, language
proficiency, clothing, posture—the newly discriminating child may also
experience the pleasure of discovering the ability to torment or “make fun
of” his/her adversaries. As mentioned in the introduction, sometimes
inflicting pain compensates somewhat for an individual’s own angst.
There’s a “deep motive” at work here; one unrelated to the usual
motivation implied in structures of cultural knowledge (Nuckolls 2001;
Quinn 2005a). Helena’s classmates and/or their parents may be projecting
some of their own anxieties onto Erzika, experiencing their own
proscribed aggression as hers, perhaps, and thus perceiving her as
threatening (Clarke 1999). “Deep motivation,” Nuckolls and others
explain, is related to identity conflict resulting from childhood experience
and includes the agent’s desire to master the environment, control his/her
actions, seek self-realization, or manipulate power relations (Nuckolls
2001:182; Quinn 2005a).
The next excerpt, Number 6, provides more evidence of the role of
labeling and the acquisition of cultural models of self and other—us and
them—and scripts for relations between them. It also suggests another
13

Expounding on political subjectivity, Rahimi (2011) notes that the subject is political
in its very subjectivity: both in the sense that it engages in an ongoing act of
subjugating/conjugating the world into meaningful and temporal patterns, and in the
sense that it is subjugated/conjugated by the local meaning system in order to become a
social subject. Meaning is always political because it is always the representation of a
specific ‘interest’. This of course does not have to be the conscious ‘interest’ of a
specific group or class, as in the interests of the state or the ruling class, but it is always
an interest, and always the interest commonly shared by a ‘group of people.’
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deep motive common to children, that of not disappointing their parents,
which recalls Quinn’s (2005c:480) observation that “the dread of losing
parental approval or the need for parental approval provides strong
motivation well into adolescence and beyond (Quinn 2005c:480).
Excerpt 6: Eva
My prejudices were built quietly by the general view of
society I grew up in. And as I grew older, I suddenly
realized there were some stereotypes I had adopted from
the many trifling events and deceptive words and gestures
that instilled in me and many others a prejudice toward
people we didn’t even know. There is one Slovak word,
‘ciganit,’ which means `to lie; to cheat.’ It is derived from
the word `cigan,’ and that means `gypsy.’ Every time I lied
or cheated, my parents called me `cigan,’ and I knew I did
a bad thing and was ashamed of myself. But this simple
phrase didn’t only show me that I acted wrong. It also
indicated that there are some people who lie and cheat all
the time and are therefore bad. I became distrustful of this
group of people, although I didn’t know any of them.
In Excerpt 6, Eva describes the role of public culture, including
what she calls “trifling events and deceptive words and gestures,” in
propagating and perpetuating stereotypic cultural models of Roma. She’s
referring to the daily social practices and attendant social patterns, the
material culture, and the public discourse to which she has been exposed
throughout her life. All of it has resulted in the buildup or internalization
of a great deal of tacit knowledge, or habitus, that informs her reasoning
about people like and unlike herself. Her account attests to the flow of
cultural meaning from outside to inside to outside again; specifically, her
internalization of public culture leads to personal feelings of aversion and
subsequent acts of prejudice. Anthropologist Christina Toren (2001),
studies cultural transmission among Fijians and is especially interested in
how children become particular adults. She notes that history inheres in
the living persons whose actions make social structures, institutions,
ideologies, and cultural models material (157). By this she means that our
practices objectify or instantiate cultural beliefs such that when others
observe us, they learn what various things signify as well as how to
behave in typical situations. The effect of this process, says Toren, is that
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“children come to constitute the categories in whose terms adults represent
what they know of the world” (170), which is seen again and again in
narratives such as Eva’s. Here, as in the previous excerpt, the ethnic label,
cigan, routinely employed by Eva’s parents, seems to have condensed
many of the myths associated with Roma into a single word with the
capacity to evoke a variety of feelings and intentions (Greenberg,
Kirkland, and Pyszczynski 1988:77). Young Eva’s understanding of
Roma is conditioned by parental authority by way of shame and fear and
is therefore highly emotionally charged. It is associated with feelings of
self-worth, as well with treachery and depravity; feelings that are likely to
lead to anxiety and a lack of empathy and prejudice (Sherwood 1980).
In sum, Eva has an understanding of what a normal person should
be like; a personal or idiosyncratic model of personhood based on her own
life experiences. Roma do not accord with her model. The conviction
that they are lesser human beings, that they are somehow defective,
constitutes part of Eva’s self-system (Hollan 2000; Quinn 2006) and is
probably similar, though not an exact replica, of that of many of her
countrymen, each of whom is exposed to similar public culture but has
had his/her own personal experiences with Roma. According to the model
of Deep Cognition described above, she will use this model, this mental
structure with its attendant affects, as an interpretive tool with which to
organize perceptions and affects and to reason about the people she
encounters. It will constitute one of the many critical models that form the
cognitive background against which sensory input pertaining to the social
world will be appraised.
As mentioned, Excerpt 6, like all those preceding it, highlights the
critical role played by Czech parents in rearing children to be the kinds of
adults who will be valued in the community. All demonstrate that the
emotional interaction between a child and his/her primary caregivers is
fundamental to self-organization. That is, the creation of self is achieved
partly by incorporating others’ attributes, generating templates or models
for understanding future relationships, such as those between Czechs and
non-Czechs that are under review (Nuckolls 2001:189). Another way to
put this is that we recall things the way in which we learn them, with
similar emotional salience. Here I highlight the shift of focus in
psychoanalytic theory from the strictly intrapsychic or subjective realm to
the interpersonal or intersubjective realm. This post-Freudian move away
from problems of drive regulation and toward relationship difficulties is
attributable to the mid-20th century realization that interpersonal
distortions are built into the self and reproduced in the social order.
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Anthony Elliott explains, for example, that “the reproduction of the
patriarchal and social order of modern societies is no longer understood as
merely rooted in sexual repression and the denial of passion. Rather,
repressive social conditions are traced to various pathologies that underlie
human relationships” (2002:25). Later, he adds that “the distortions and
traps of the imaginary order shape all interactions between the self and
others, [ranging] from family interaction, through school, early adulthood,
the work environment, and human relationships more generally” (35).
The learning of ethnic cultural models being discussed here resembles
Quinn’s findings on the acquisition of cultural models of marriage by
American girls and women who come to understand and perform the role
of wife by way of lifelong exposure to culturally-specific understandings
of marriage. She concludes that
when particular ideas about human relations, about role
obligations, or about types of people have force for us,
rather than just being possible interpretations of the social
world, it is because as children and young adults we have
been socialized by means of appeals to these very ideas.
We have been taught it is our role, our nature, the way we
should be treated and treat other people. [Quinn 1992:121]
As with marriage relations between women and men, so too, I
argue, with ethnic social relations. All of the narratives, but especially
number seven (below) provide insight into how such lessons or what
Barbara Rogoff calls (2003) “guided learning” proceed. Parents employ
frightening tactics; sarcasm; emotional blackmail. Their efforts are
constant, emotionally arousing, backed by rewards and punishments,
sometimes even violence (Quinn 2005c). And they are effective:
unfamiliar objects that formerly elicited wonder subsequently give rise to
consistent and strong negative affects of anxiety, anger, disgust, and
contempt. These affects are critical components of subjectivity and
eventual motivation; the very affects that motivate discrimination,
segregation, and violence.
Excerpt 7: Honza
Czech parents play a decisive role in shaping the opinions
and attitudes of their children. From the very beginning,
Czech kids are taught to hate gypsies. They are told,
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`Avoid those lousy gypsies;’ `Beware of your pocket, they
will steal your wallet;’ `Do not talk to them;’ `They are
making children in order to suck our money;’ `They are so
stupid, they cannot even speak Czech.’ This kind of
propaganda is heard in most Czech families—including
mine.
My attitudes toward gypsies came from the
emotions of a little child who was not capable of critical
thinking. There is still some prejudice due to those first
negative encounters.
Intra-Cultural Variation: Individuality and Personality
To this point, I’ve created the impression that Czech society is
homogeneous, that a particular form of culture is evenly distributed
among all Czechs. It appears that as a result of child socialization all
Czechs are racists; that they all regard Roma as inferior human beings.
Such stereotyping is mistaken, of course; cultural understandings are not
simply transmitted intact from generation to generation and uniformly
shared among all members of a society. Children don’t merely acquire
ready-made meanings proffered by adults. Deep Cognition enables us to
understand “intra-cultural variation” (Chodorow 1999) by confirming that
Czechs don’t all feel the same way about themselves, nor do they bring
the same understandings—or fantasies—about others to their encounters
with Roma. Accordingly, not all Czechs are ultra-nationalists, nor are
they all paranoid. Many people, in fact, are highly critical of their society,
and many empathize with—and even defend the rights of—Roma. As
explained above, the reasons for this might include variations in subjective
experience due to differences in the infant-caretaker relationship, as well
as variations in intrapersonal understandings due to the different personal
experiences of public culture attendant on structural differences in Czech
society (Kusserow 2004). By way of the argument presented above,
varying self-systems, comprised of varying senses of self and varying
models of personhood, appraise the world differently and arrive at
differing interpretations, and hence, at differing intentions. So, in crosscultural encounters with Roma, not all Czechs experience ambivalence
followed by anxiety-triggering defense mechanisms; all Czechs do not
project personal hostility onto Roma. In the next two excerpts, I
demonstrate that the negative cultural model of Roma and the feeling of
patriotic pride, though widely distributed, are nonetheless not universally
distributed throughout the Czech population. Rather, Czech individuals,
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each embodying what Strauss (1992) calls a personal semantic network,
think, feel, and behave variably toward Roma.
Excerpt 8: Veronika
I was born in Prague under a totalitarian system and at a
time of little hope for change.
My father studied
philosophy and economics at the university, while my
mother worked in the library. We lived in a small flat in a
beautiful old house in a predominantly gypsy neighborhood
called Smichov. We shared a bathroom with five gypsy
families living there. We were the only “whites” in the
place, and I played every day with our neighbors. My best
friend was a girl called Zdenka and when my parents went
out at night I spent the night at our neighbors’ house and
had dinner with them and played all night with my friends.
At that time I didn’t realize they were any different from us.
I didn’t know anything else. Both of my parents love all
that is different, and I was raised this way, too.
Excerpt 9: Lenka
My first experience with gypsies was in my hometown and
was generally positive. Since childhood, I have lived in a
block of flats next to a gypsy family. I met them all the time
growing up and never knew they were of a different origin.
No one in the house ever had problems with them. They
had regular jobs, their children attended school, and they
were quiet and respectful neighbors. I only became aware
of the existence of gypsies in the 1990s due to racial
tension between Czech authorities and the gypsies over the
construction of a wall on Maticni Street in Usti nad Labem.
Gypsies took the opportunity to flee our country, in order
to seek asylum in Canada, Great Britain, Belgium, and
Sweden. This incident ruined the image of Czechs in the
West and made Maticni Street a headline issue.
These two accounts demonstrate the efficacy of the cognitivepsychoanalytic paradigm to explain cultural complexity (Hannerz 1993).
Veronika and Lenka experienced a different kind of upbringing in
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comparison to those of the narrators of the preceding accounts. They did
not live apart from Roma, nor were they deluded by racist diatribes.
Rather, their parents were trusting and pluralistic. As children, both girls
were unaware of any social difference and were completely at ease in the
presence of Roma. “Rom” and “Gypsy” were not salient cognitiveemotional categories for either of them, and as a consequence, relations
between their families and their Roma neighbors were amicable. The
interesting note, of course, occurs in the second narrative, number nine,
where Lenka notes that the nationalist discourse unleashed by the collapse
of the Warsaw Pact has an impact on her understandings of herself and
other Czechs and of Roma. Her new perspective includes national
consciousness and pride, as well as doubts about the loyalty and integrity
of Czech Roma. This remodeling of her personal understandings
highlights the capacity of Deep Cognition to accommodate the dynamism
of the human experience.
Conclusion
Paul Bohannen known more for his work in economic
anthropology, observed late in his career that “in the process of learning
culture, people come to regard the particular version of it that they learn—
their own culture—as a part of the natural world” (1994:21). To
counteract bias, he offered, people need to “correct for their own culture
as they observe other cultures,” which, he further advised, “requires an
unusual capacity to see one’s own culture as an attribute of one’s self
rather than as part of the essence either of one’s self or of the natural
world” (ibid.38). His comments call to mind social attribution theory,
which asserts that when people make decisions on attribution, they
consistently succumb to cognitive distortions of two types: (1) the selfserving bias, which occurs when positive events are attributed to the
observer’s dispositional traits and negative events are attributed to
situational factors; and (2) the actor-observer bias, which occurs when the
same negative event is attributed to situational factors when it involves the
observer and to dispositional traits when it involves an observed actor
(Monroe, Hankin, and Van Vechten 2000). At first glance, social
attribution theory appears to be in line with much of what has been
discussed here. Specifically, it implies that cognition contains a projective
element; hence, it locates explanation of prejudice in the imaginations of
Czechs. It understands, in short, that “ethnicity is a perspective on the
world, rather than a thing in it” (Brubaker (2004). In this final section I
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would like to reconsider attribution in the context of my earlier findings. I
set up my concluding remarks with the last of my narratives.
Excerpt 10: Karel
First time when I could find that there was something
wrong with our society’s relationship to Gypsies was when
I started my first year at school. Jirka (a Rom) attended
the same classroom as I did. All of us in the class were
ordinary children—full of life, curious, and also cruel—
and we started to make differences. One day, there was an
ordinary break. We used to leave our class to meet other
pupils from other classes. There was a corridor and at its
end was a door half made of glass. All of a sudden,
somebody decided to take off his sandal and throw it at
another boy. This boy then did the same and after a while
there were about fifteen people playing this game. Jirka
was among them. Everything would have been all right if
someone had not hit the glass of the door. All the boys ran
away instantly and waited to see what would happen. The
noise of the broken glass brought a teacher to our class.
She asked who had broken the glass since it was obvious
that it must have been somebody from our collective. All
the boys knew who had done it. But then something
happened that really surprised me. The absolute silence
was broken by the boy responsible for the broken glass. He
said, `Jirka. Jirka broke the glass.’ This was a cruel and
cool-hearted lie. The reaction of the others was immediate
and shocking: `Yes. It was Jirka,’ they claimed. Why
him? Why did the boy who broke the glass blame Jirka?
Was it just because he knew that Jirka belonged among the
rascals? Or had the boy already noticed that the teachers
see Jirka through their fingers14 because he was Gypsy? I
wish I knew. Jirka himself did not get a chance to prove
his innocence. Actually, no one would have believed him.
The teacher who had already had a suspicion towards
14

I’m told by a native speaker of Czech that if one looks through one' s fingers at
someone, it means that one doesn’t like him/her; that one doesn’t think highly of him/her
because s/he is different from oneself; in addition, one thinks that one is better than
him/her (Luci Skřítek Krejčíková personal communication).
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Jirka easily accepted the cruel lie to be true. Jirka had bad
luck. I remember the boys, content with the result of
‘investigation.’ They were laughing at him. I realized
something and it lodged deeply in my mind: Jirka was
someone who to be friends with meant that others would
not be friendly to me. After that, Jirka became a target of
our ridicule. He had to play a role he had not chosen. We
`the majority’ cast him in that role. Finally, at the end of
the first term it was decided he was going to leave because
he failed. He was sent to a special school. Was it better
for him? I do not know. One more thing: The one who
broke the glass and blamed Jirka, became at the age of
sixteen one of the skinheads. Matter of chance? I do not
think so.
Several things merit brief comment in this example. Most
remarkable is that the teacher commits the actor-observer bias when she
attributes the negative event—the broken window—not to situational
factors, but rather to Jirka’s character. Her response might also be
considered evidence of the self-serving bias, because she never considers
the possibility that such mayhem could have been caused by a Czech like
herself, leaving the blame to the only Rom in the classroom. Many of the
young children—the actual perpetrator more so than the rest—are already
knowledgeable of the Roma stereotype and skillful in scapegoating Roma.
They, too, understand the actor-observer bias, and they know implicitly
that their teacher is influenced by it and apt to make assumptions
accordingly. Karel’s remark that “no one would have believed [Jirka]”
provides evidence of this. Such intersubjective knowledge plays an
important role in the children’s reasoning and decision-making process.
Thus, social attribution theory would appear to offer a solid explanation
for much of what transpires in this and many of the foregoing narratives.
Yet, without specifying the cognitive structures and affective
processes attendant on the mental representations of self, other, and
relations between them—without, that is, operationalizing more recent
insights of the cognitive revolution—its conclusions can only remain
partial and, therefore, unsatisfactory. Closer scrutiny, in fact, reveals that
social attribution theory repeats many of the errors that have been
criticized elsewhere in this paper. It presents a monolithic view of Czech
society. It assumes that all Czechs hold the same understandings of self
and other, and that they all have identical feelings, which, in turn, assumes
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that childrearing has been a uniform experience for all Czechs (Briggs
1998). Together, these assumptions lead one to conclude that all Czechs
have the same subjective experiences and that they are equally biased and
hateful. But as was the case with narratives 8 and 9, Karel’s narrative
reveals that many of these inferences are inaccurate. For while there
appears to be consensus and contentment among the boys in the
classroom, Karel himself is initially shocked by the dishonesty and lack of
compassion shown by his classmates. Surely, his upbringing was
different; surely, the values of compassion and truthfulness were stressed
more in his family, even if he soon comes to the realization that “Jirka
was someone who to be friends with meant that others would not be
friendly to me.” That is, his understanding of himself and of Roma
deepens, and he soon joins the majority in tormenting Jirka, although it is
apparent that he feels guilty in doing so. Jirka, meanwhile, is ridiculed
and shunned for the rest of the first term, and subsequently sent to a
special school, an outcome that fortifies the models of Czech, Rom, and
relations between them. And so, once again, we come back to the issue of
agency, and we see that social attribution theory, like many other social
science accounts, does not venture far enough into the interior domain of
human life; into subjectivity (Frank 2006; Luhrman 2006). Consequently,
its account of meaning-making and motivation falls short. The remedy is
to exploit what psychology has to offer and to recognize thereby that
“individual members of society have different feelings, different
personalities, different dispositions, both over the course of time and at
any one moment” (Luhrman 2006:347).
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